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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
HEADQUARTERS
SECND MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FMF, ATLANTIC
MARINE CORPS AIR STATION, CHERRY POINT, N. C.

1/1500
Sor: 01A15562

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From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic
Subj: Report of Exercise "QUICK KICK"
Ref: (a) FMFLANT Order 3500.1

1. General.

a. Exercise "QUICK KICK" was a joint operation involving Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Forces, under the command of Commander Joint Task Force-122. The amphibious operation, as a portion of the Joint Exercise, was conducted 7-9 June in the Camp Lejeune/Cherry Point, North Carolina area. The amphibious operation included movement from the Caribbean area to the amphibious objective area, assault landings by the Southern Attack Group and Northern Attack Group (constructive), seizure and defense of assigned beachheads, link-up operations, and reembarkation (constructive) of the assault forces.

b. Landing Force Aviation was assigned the mission of establishing assigned forces on designated airfields during the positioning phase and providing air support for the Attack Groups. The Task Organization for Landing Force Aviation consisted of Southern Landing Group Aviation and Northern Landing Group Aviation. Southern Landing Group Aviation (command group), embarked in USS Mt. McKinley, reported to Commander Southern Landing Group and provided air support for the amphibious assault. Northern Landing Group Aviation (constructive) was assigned the mission of providing air support for the Northern Landing Group.

2. Personnel.

a. There were no unusual personnel problems during this exercise. Personnel of Southern Landing Group Aviation, Marine Air Support Squadron-1, and Marine Aircraft Group-26 (-) were embarked aboard assigned shipping with the Southern Landing Group. Headquarters, Landing Force Aviation, Marine Wing Headquarters Group-2, and Marine Aircraft Group-14 were positioned at MCAS, Cherry Point, N.C.

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FLEET MARINE FORCE, ATLANTIC
NORFOLK II, VIRGINIA

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20 September 1962

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From: Commanding General
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Subj: Major Exercise Report, QUICK KICK (U)

Ref: (a) CG II MEF OpPlan 501-62

Encl: (1) CG 2d MarDiv Quick Kick Report
(2) CG 2d MAW Quick Kick Report
(3) CG Force Troops, Atlantic Quick Kick Report

1. GENERAL. In accordance with reference (a), this headquarters participated as the landing force (II MEF) in Quick Kick, an Atlantic Command joint exercise conducted during the period 1-11 May 1962 in the Camp Lejeune-Cherry Point, N. C. complex. Quick Kick participants included elements of the U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces assigned to Joint Task Force 122. Commander JTF 122 was in overall command. Quick Kick immediately followed Exercise Phibex 1-62, a major Navy-Marine amphibious operation conducted in the Caribbean area from 11-30 April 1962. The detailed task organization of II MEF for Quick Kick and the concept of the operation appear in reference (a).

2. COMMENTS.

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a. General. MARINE CORPS HISTORICAL ARCHIVES

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(1) This was the initial participation of this force in joint operations and results indicate that our operational procedures are compatible with other services or can be adapted where differences exist.

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(2) Reports of subordinate participants are included as enclosure (1) thru (3) and contain valuable information relative to the ground and air aspects of the exercise. These reports are concurred in unless otherwise noted. Cognizant staff sections of this headquarters will take necessary remedial action or include recommendations in future planning as appropriate.

b. Administrative.

(1) The requirement established on D-Day for 15 minute reports of build-up of landing forces ashore after H-Hour was difficult to meet. Such requirements should be made known as early in the planning phase as possible. A calendar of events such as appeared in the Army Task Force plan, keyed by a simple message indicating execution of each event, is considered to be a useful device to speed the flow of "spot" reports.

(2) Operation plans and orders of other services which required close coordination were received too late at the action echelon to be of optimum value.

c. Intelligence.

(1) During the planning phase a minimum of intelligence was received upon which an intelligence annex could be written at subordinate levels. Problem artificialities, overlap with Phibex 1-62, and the Presidential demonstration created a mal-deployment of forces which precluded any desired exchange of liaison officers or liaison visits which would have insured continuity in planning.

(2) The concept of operations was of a scope that did not fully test the intelligence capability of the landing force elements. This was realized and accepted, primarily because the nature of the exercise was to test the functions of component commanders in the formation of a joint task force. The associated intelligence reflected the level of the problem.

d. Special Operations.

In Quick Kick, special operations were conducted by a separate task force responsible to CJTF 122. Forces under Commander, Joint UW Task Force Atlantic operated in the area of responsibility of the landing force commander without prior coordination. This imposed unnecessary restrictions on the freedom of action of the conventional

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ground commanders. It is noted that COMJUWTF A recognized this problem in his report (concurred in by CJTF 122), and has stated that special forces should pass to the control of the command having primary responsibility for an area during UW operations.

e. Command and Control.

(1) The Commandant of the Marine Corps has established the policy that Marine forces will be committed as an air-ground team and that this identity will be retained throughout a given operation. This policy was incompatible with the JTF 122 Quick Kick directives, which required that upon completion of the amphibious operation, all ground forces would pass to Army control and all air forces would pass to Air Force control. The only compatible solution would be to pass the MEF in toto to the Army Task Force commander and require that the Air Force commander control Marine air elements through the MEF Headquarters.

(2) This headquarters was not able to follow the progress of the airborne landings and movements on D-Day and consequently was unable to provide direction to the amphibious landing force relative to its scheduled link-up with the airborne forces. This has been determined to be a procedural discrepancy in communications which will be corrected.

f. Air Operations.

Commanding General, FMFLant strongly endorses the Commanding General, Second Marine Aircraft Wing position, contained in enclosure (2), relating to restricting amphibious task force air operations to the AOA. In essence, it is unrealistic to expect the amphibious task force commander to provide an adequate air defense for his force if limited to the 30 mile circle enclosed by the AOA. He alone of the air commanders possesses the equipment - in being and operative - as he closes the objective area, with which to conduct air defense operations. It is only after protected sites are uncovered during initial operations in the objective area that the Air Force can effectively assume this function.

g. Communications.

Radio frequency propagation characteristics were the major contributing factor to unreliable radio communications. This situation

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is expected to continue as long as the military portion of the radio frequency spectrum remains crowded. Unless a significant technical breakthrough in the area of transmission capabilities occurs, reliable radio communication, at distances between 20 and 250 miles, will never become a reality.

3. TEST OBJECTIVES. No specific test objectives were assigned for this exercise. It will be noted that eleven test objectives were thoroughly examined and reported on during the preceding Phibex operation.

4. SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS. This introduction to joint operations proved of great training value to this force. Problems inherent in operations of this type and scope have been identified and will be resolved in future exercises.

5. CONCLUSIONS.

a. A simplified readily-transmitted situation reporting system is required if higher headquarters are to be kept informed of the progress of the battle in the detail indicated in this exercise.

b. Operations plans and orders must be received sufficiently far in advance of execution phase if they are to be properly executed.

c. The landing force commander needs positive control of UW forces operating in his area.

d. Present Atlantic Command arrangements for command relations in joint operations after completion of the amphibious phase preclude adherence to the CMC policy of command integrity of the Marine air-ground team.

e. A constant flow of information between the airborne task force and landing force commanders is essential to the efficient execution of joint operations.

f. Air defense should be the responsibility of the force having the best capability to control air defense facilities.

g. Communications difficulties between the services arose over a mutual unfamiliarity with operational procedures. Communications and frequency coordination must be early and continuous.

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6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

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- a. That a detailed calendar of events be published by the Joint Task Force Commander and disseminated to higher headquarters; to be keyed by a simple code message which can be transmitted to indicate that a given event has taken place.
- b. That all participants be enjoined to make timely submission of operational directives.
- c. That UW forces operating in the AOA chop to the landing force commander not later than D-Day.
- d. That command relations in joint operations after completion of the amphibious phase be restudied to provide for maintaining the integrity of the Marine air-ground team, through assignment of air sectors of responsibility congruent with or inclusive of the zone of action of Marine ground forces.
- e. That lateral communications be established as a matter of routine between the airborne and landing force commanders.
- f. That responsibility for air defense in the objective area be assigned to the amphibious task force commander until such time as the Air Force commander is operational in the objective area.
- g. That communications exercises be held between services whenever possible.



W. F. HAUSMAN
By direction

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